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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
ACTIONS-SPLITrINO
SAmE TnANSAcTio.-A

CAUSE

or

ACTION-JOINDER-CLAIMS

AmsixG OUT or

was injured in an automobile accident and at the same
time the automobile was damaged to some extent. The insurance company,
having insured A's automobile, recovered in an action against the person causing
the accident under the subrogation clause of the policy. Later A sues the driver
of the other automobile to recover for the personal injuries to himself and is
met with the defense that there was only one cause of action for injuries both
to person and property and since recovery was had by the insurance company
for the damage to the property, this action for personal injuries is barred.
Held. Damages resulting from a single tort, even though such damages be
partly property damage and partly personal injury damage, are, when suffered by one person, the subject of only one suit as against the wrongdoer.
Sprague v. Adams, 39 Wash. Dec. 389, 947 Pac. 960 (1926).
There are two well defined lines of decisions on this question in the United
States, with the weight of authority in favor of the decision reached in the
principal case. The important question in these cases is that of determimng
just what a cause of action is. The English rule, which is contrary to that of
the principal case, relies on the argument that the negligence of the defendant
in itself constitutes no cause of action, but that the cause of action arises only
out of the damage which the negligence causes. Hence this line of cases holds
that when the rights of person and property are invaded, even though by the
same negligent act and at the same time, two rights of action spring up in
favor of the person injured. Brunsden v. Humphrey, 14 Q. B. Div. 141 (1884)
Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., 170 N. Y. 40, 69 N. E. 779, 57 L. R. A.
176, 88 Am. St. Rep. 636 (1902) Ochs v. Public Service R. Co., 81 N. J. Law
Scher661, 80 AfU. 495, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 240, Ann. Cas. 1919D 955 (1911)
merhorn v. Los Angeles R. Co., 18 Cal. App. 454, 193 Pac. 351 (1919) Boyd
v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 218 Fed. 653 (1914) Borden's Condensed Milk Co.
v. Mosby, -50 Fed. 839 (1918). The line of decisions supporting the rule laid
down in Washington bases its holdings upon the ground that as the defendant's act is single, and that since different injuries occasioned by it are merely
items of damage proceeding from the same wrong, there is but one right of
action for injuries both to person and property. Birmingham So. By. Co. v.
Lintner 141 Ala. 420, 38 So. 363, 109 Am. St. Rep. 40, 3 Ann. Cas. 461 (1904)
King v. C. M. L St. P R. Co., 80 Minn. 83, 89 N W 1113, 50 L. R. A. 161, 81
Am. St. Rep. 238 (1900) Coy v. St. L. e S. F R. Co., 186 Mo. App. 408, 179
S. W 446 (1915), Cassidy v. Berkovitz, 169 Ky. 785, 185 S. W 199 (1916)
Chicago West. Div. R. Co. v. Ingraham, 131 I1. 659, 93 N. E. 350 (1890)
SUTHERLAND: CODE PImXAIG PRACTICE Awn FoRams: (Ist ed.), § 902. The courts
uniformly hold that if the property belongs to one person and the person
injured is another, then two causes of action arise, one in favor of the person
injured and one in favor of the owner of the property. Southern By. v. King,
160 Fed. 339, 87 C. C. A. (5th Circ.) 284 (1908) Taylor v. Manhattan B. Co.,
53 Hun. 305, 6 N. Y. S. 488 (1889).
The real basis of the decisions holding that there is but one cause of
action where both personal and property damage is done by the same negligent
act would seem to be the avoidance of multiplicity of suits rather than that
there is but one cause of action. Even the courts holding that there is hut one
right of action when the injuries are to the same man uniformly hold that
there are two causes of action when the injury to person is to one and the
injury to property is to another, although the accident happens in identically
the same way. This would seem to imply that there is a right in the person
and another separate and distinct right in the property. There would
seem to be no adequate reason for the view that there is but one right of action
when both rights invaded are in one person and that there are two separate
actions when the rights are held by separate persons, unless it be that of preventing a multiplicity of suits. On the question of separate rights see Reilly r.
Sicilian Asphalt Co., supra,and King v. C. M. 4 St. P B. Co., supra.
G. Dz G.
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BANKS AND BANKING--PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-APPALENT AUTHORITY
AcrioNs Foa DzPosrrs.-W, a general agent authorizedly indorsed his firm's
checks "Rice-Greisen Company, by H. M. Watts, Manager." Upon requesting
the defendant bank to deposit the checks to ins personal account, the bank
made inquiries and discovered that W was local manager of the plaintiff firm.
Nevertheless, the bank received the deposits and credited same to the personal
account of W Plaintiff sues bank on the ground that an agent cannot deposit
his firm's checks to his personal account and the bank is chargeable with notice
of such lack of authority. Held: Plaintiff could not recover. Rice v. Peoples
Savings Bank, 40 Wash. Dec. 7, 247 Pac. 1009 (1926).
Where an agent deposits in a bank to his own account moneys of -ins
principal, a constructive trust is impressed upon the deposit in favor of the
principal. Van Alen v. American National Bank, 5- N. Y. 1 (1873) Turner v.
Williams, 114 Kans. 769, 221 P 267 (193), 39 Cyc. 191. If the bank has
notice or is chargeable with notice that the trust is being violated by the
agent, the principal may hold the bank liable for wrongfully crediting the
funds impressed with a trust to the agent's personal account (according
to one line of authority) or for the wrongful withdrawal of such funds
The theory upon which lia(according to another line of authority).
bility is predicated is that the bank participates in the wrongful diversion of
the funds. Mott Iron Works v. Metropolitan Bank, 78 Wash. 294, 139 Pac. 36
(1914), U. S. Fidelity k G. Co. v. People's Bank, 197 Tenn. 720, 157 S. W 414
(1913) (entry of trust funds held a conversion) Dempsey Oil 4. Gas Co. v.
Citizens National Bank, 119 Okl. 39, 235 Pac. 1104 (1925), Allen v. Puritan
Trust Co., 211 Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 916, L. R. A. 1915C, 518 (1912) 3 R. C. L.
551. Just what circumstances constitute notice or constructive notice is a perplexing question, the authorities being difficult to harmonize. See notes to Allen
v. PuritanTrust Co., supra. Whatever puts a party on inquiry in the exercise
of reasonable care, where the means of knowledge are at hand, is notice of all
facts that such inquiry should reasonably reveal. Welzler v. Nichols, 53 Wash.
285, 101 Pac. 867, 132 A. S. R. 1075 (1909) Daly v. Rizzutto, 59 Wash. 62, 109
Pac. 276, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 467 (1910) 20 R. C. L. 346. And tins rule is applicable to banks in their relations to depositors. Allen v. Puritan Trust Co.,
supra;Keeney v. Bank, 33 Cal. App. 515, 165 P. 735 (1917). A mere suspicion
is ordinarily not notice. See Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343, 15 L. ed. 934
(1857). 5 Rose's Notes 58; 20 R. C. L. 351. The bank need not go outside the
channels of its business to acquire notice of the intended diversion of the funds.
Merchants' etc. National Bank v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 56 S. C. 320, 33 S. E. 750
(1899), see also Keeney v. Bank, supra.
In the principal case, the indorsement coupled with the bank's independent
knowledge of agency after investigation is held insufficient notice of the intended diversion when the agent asks to have the check credited to his Individual
account. Prima facie, an agent has no authority to negotiate his principal's
paper for his own interest And an early case holds that the fact that the proceeds of a bill are passed to the credit of the agent is proof that the agent is
acting for his own benefit so as not to bind the principal. Stanback v. Commonwealth Bank, 11 Grat. (Va.) 269 (1854). Nevertheless, the courts are
reluctant to hold the bank liable, as is shown by the decision in the principal
case and others. U S. Fidelity k G. Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Monrovia, 18
Cal. App. 433, 123 P 352 (1912), Martin v. Kansas Nat. Bank, 66 Kan. 655, 72
Pac. 218 (1903). Tins reluctance may be explained by commercial expediency.
To impose a duty on the banks to supervise the acts of agents with respect to
principals with whom they are not otherwise in privity would place an onerous
burden on the banks and seriously interfere with commercial transactions.
C. H.
3 R. C. L. 550.
BouwDAlms-AsCEaTAIrMXsXT AND EsTs-AS sNT--EVEiENCE-SuFMicE c.m-A, the owner of lots 4, 5, and 8 in a certain addition to the city of
Seattle, contracted to sell to B lot 8 and the east 60 feet of lot 5. The line
between lots 8 and 4 was not marked on the ground, but it was understood
between the parties that A, who claimed to know the true line, should locate
the same and erect a concrete wall thereon. After the wall was erected A con-
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veyed the property to B. On lot 4, which was immediately to the north of
lot 8, and which A subsequently conveyed to C, there was a dwelling house.
B brought this action in ejectment against C, claiming that the wall was not
upon the true lot line, and that the eaves of the house on lot 4 extended over
the dividing line between the lots. Upon the trial an engineer who made a
survey at the instance of B, based upon the city survey of 1910, testified that
the concrete wall was not on the dividing line and that the eaves of the house
did extend over the true line. This addition had been platted some years prior
to the city survey of 1910. Held: In the absence of a showing that the monuments set at the time the addition was platted coincide with those set by the
city subsequently, the evidence does not show that the concrete wall was not
upon the true line. Suter v. Campbell, 39 Wash. Dec. 9, 245 Pac. 29 (1926).
This decision simply holds that in order to prove that the concrete wall
was not upon the true line it must be shown that it was improperly located
according to the original survey, and that unless it is shown that the subsequent city survey coincides with the original plat, a survey based upon monuments set by the city subsequently, proves nothing regarding the location of the
lot lines.
It is the general and well recognized rule that in the case of a discrepancy
between an original and a subsequent survey, the location of lot lines is governed by the original plat, and no subsequent survey can be allowed to unsettle
these boundaries to affect the vested rights of purchasers. Pere Marquette
Ry. Co. v. Tower Motor Truck Co., 922 Mich. 301, 192 N. W 634 (1923)
Washington Rock Co. v. Young, 29 Utah 108, 80 Pac. 382, 110 A. S. R. 666
(1905) Mills v. Penny, 74 Iowa 172, 37 N. W 135, 7 A. S. R. 474 (1888)
Flynn v. Glenney, 51 Mich. 58, 17 N. W 65 (1883) Le Compte v. Lueders, 90
Mich. 495, 51 N. W 542, 30 A. S. R. 450 (1892). The rule is also applicable to
public lands surveyed under the direction of the United States government.
Pittsmont Copper Co. v. Vanina, 71 Mont. 44, 227 Pac. 46 (1924) Hickman v.
Jones, 106 Neb. 466, 183 N. W 980 (1921).
When the discrepancy is between a survey and a plat of lands, the survey
controls when it can be ascertained, and one who purchases with reference to
the monuments and boundaries, acquires title regardless of the lines shown by
the recorded plat. Olson v. Seattle, 30 Wash. 687, 71 Pac. 201 (1903) Root
v. Town of Cincinnati, 87 Iowa 203, 54 N. W 206 (1893) Halst v. Streitz, 16
Neb. 249, 20 N. W 307 (1884) Burk v. Mcowen, 115 Cal. 481, 47 Pac. 367
(1896). As a matter of fact, the object of a resurvey is not to dispute the correctness of or to control the original survey but its only effect is as evidence
tending to deterImne the location of the original lines. Trotter v. Stayton, 41
Ore. 117, 68 Pac. 3 (1902) Washington Rock Co. v. Young, 29 Utah 108, 80 Pac.
382, 110 A. S. R. 666 (1905) Pereles v. Gross, 196 Wis. 122, 105 N. WV 217
(1905) Fellows v. Willett, 98 Okla. 248, 224 Pac. 298 (1923). A perusal of the
above decisions clearly shows that the principal case is in accord with the weight
of authority. It follows also the doctrine as recogmzed and adopted in Olson
v. Seattle, supra.
It appears that the principal case of Suter v. Campbell might have
been decided by the rule of law that the location of a boundary line by a common grantor, is binding upon the grantees. Turner v. Creech, 58 Wash. 439,
108 Pac. 1084 (1910)
Osteen v. Wynn, 131 Ga. 109, 62 S. E. 37, 127 A. S. R.
212 (1908) Herse v. Questa, 100 App. Div. 59, 91 N. Y. S. 778 (1904) 9 C. J.
244. But the Court considered it unnecessary to determine whether the evidence brought the case within this rule, affirming an order of dismissal entered
upon the insufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence to uphold is contentions.
G. W McC.
DAMAGEs--Loss OF PRoviTS-EvInzuce-SurrFICsc1y.-Defendant wrongfully converted plaintiff's property, thereby breaking up a dairy business of
several years standing. The evidence showed that the business, when the
plaintiff took it over, and for some time previous, was unprofitable; that this
was probably due to the run-down condition of the physical property of the
dairy; that the plaintiff, who had recently acqmrid the business, was rapidly

RECENT CASES
rectifying this condition by improvements and investments; that at the time
of conversion the plaintiff "had built up a good, high-class dairy plant in King
County within convement distance of the city of Seattle" worth over $100,000.
Neither the prospective profits, nor the profits for the eight months the plaintiff
operated the dairy, were shown with any certainty but some "substantial
profits" were shown. From a judgment for the plaintiff for the value of the
converted property, plus $7,500 for the destruction of the business, the defendant appeals. Held (Mackintosh, J., dissenting): As a matter of law the verdict
is not excessive. Seely v. Peabody, 39 Wash. Dec. 990, 947 Pac. 471 (1926).
Where an established business has been injured, our Court, in common
with the majority of American courts, allows recovery for loss of profits. Such
profits bften cannot, and are not required to be, shown with certainty, but
sufficient data must be presented so that they may be reasonably ascertained,
and so that they are not too speculative and conjectural. Allison v. Chandler
11 Mich. 55-9 (1863) Belch v. Big Store Co., 46 Wash. 1, 89 Pac. 174 (1907),
Bogart v. Pitchless Lumber Co., '7 Wash. 417, 130 Pac. 490 (1913) Sodoll V.
Taylor, 86 Wash. 417, 151 Pac. 41 (1915), Lioutzenhser v. Peck, 89 Wash. 435,
154 Pac. 814 (1916) 1 SEnwIcicK oi DaGsS (9th ed.) § 182.
Where, as in the principal case, the act causing the destruction of the business is a wilful wrong, our Court takes the view that the damages need not be
measured with any degree of meety, and apparently requires but slight proof
of prospective profits. Seidell v. Taylor, supra, citing Burckhardt v. Burckhardt, 49 Ohio St. 474, 51 Am. Rep. 84- (1885), and Allison v. Chandler,supra.
Tlus view is open to the criticism that it is an attempt to let punitive damages in by the back door. It would seem that the plaintiff should be held up
to the same standard of proof whether the act causing the damages is a wilful
wrong or not. Text writers generally make no distinction in the amount or
mcety of the proof reqmred on tis basis. 1 SanowIcK oi DAMAGES (9th ed.),
supra, 17 C. J. 795, § 117.
Whether or not the proof was sufficient in the principal case to justify the
award, is, after all, a question of fact. The amount of the award would seem
justifiable in view of the finding that some substantial profits were shown, and
that the plaintiff had built up a high class dairy plant with good prospects.
0. C. H., Ja.
MABTER AND SEVAT---WOR1uEi'S COmPEwSATiOiN AcT.-Plaintiff, a widow,
brought the action under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Washington for
the death of her husband. Deceased was employed as a spotter on the resaw in
a saw mill, his hours of work being 8:00 A. M. to 12:00 and 1:00 P M. to 5:00
P M. The morning of his death deceased punched the time clock at 7:95 A. M.
and proceeded to the mill dam, which was on the prenuses of the mill, but far
out of the line of the deceased's duties, for the avowed purpose of fishing. He
was found some time later in the water, drowned, his fishing apparatus near
him and his watch stopped at 7:40 o'clock. Held: Plaintiff could recover on
the theory that a good employee is always prompt and thirty-five minutes is a
reasonable time to arrive in advance of the whistle. Bristow v. Dept. Labor
Ind., 39 Wash. Dec. 172, 946 Pac. 573 (1926).
This case is an interpretation of parts of statutes found in Rem. Comp.
Stat., §§ 7675 and 7679, the pertinent parts of which are as follows: §7675-A
"workman" is defined as "Every person in tius state who is engaged in the
employment of an employer coming within the provisions of the Act whether
by way of manual labor or not and whether upon the premises or at the plant
or he being m the course of employment away from the plant of his employer."
"The words injury or injured as used in this Act refer only to an
injury arising from some fortuitous event as distinguished from disease."
§ 7679--"Each workman who shall be injured whether upon the premises or at
the plant or he being in the course of employment away from the plant shall
receive out of the accident fund, etc."
The Court in the present case follows Sterts v. Ind. Ins. Comm., 91 Wash.
588, 158 Pac. 9056 (1916), which case holds that the Washington Workmen's
Compensatibn Act is in reality an insurance act, designed to protect workmen
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when on the premises of their employers whether in the course of employment
or not. This is undoubtedly the meaning of the statutes in question, but recovery must be predicated upon the theory that the person injured was at the
time injured a "workman", i. e., "engaged" in the employment of an employer
coming within the Act. In the principal case it would seem to be a very questionable matter whether deceased was so "engaged" when the intention of the
deceased is taken into consideration. The Workmen's Compensation Act of
Washington is unique and, it is believed, entirely original in that jurisdiction.
Twenty-four jurisdictions of the United States require the injury to be the
result of "accident" "arising out of and in the course of employment." These
are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia. Eleven states have similar acts with the word
"accidents" omitted. These are Califorma, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Vermont, and West Virginia.
Montana employs the same wording as the first group supra with the exception
that "fortuitous event" replaces-the word "accident." In this requirement of a
fortuitous event Montana and Washington are alike and alone. Pennsylvania
requires the injury to occur "in the course of employment" and the result of
"accident." Ohio, Texas and North Dakota make the same requirement,
omitting "accident" In Wyoming the injury must be the "result of the employment" and the U. S. Civil Act covers injury "in performance of a duty."
The English act is, of course, the original enactment on the subject and similar
to the acts of the first group of jurisdictions cited.
T. M. G.
NEGLIENCE-CARE AS TO LICENSEE-RES IisA LoQUuroa.-The plaintiff,
while waiting on the sidewalk for the doors of a bank building to open, was
struck and severely injured by a roller from a window shade which had fallen
from a window in one of the upper stories of the building. Action was commenced to recover for injuries received upon the theory that the owners of
the building were bound not to injure a person passing the building or using
the sidewalk in front of the building and that when a person was so injured
a prima facte case of negligence on the part of the owners of the building was
established. Held. That the plaintiff recover, since the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applied and the burden was upon the defendant to rebut the presumption of negligence. Poth et al. v.Dexter Horton Estate, 40 Wash. Dec. 200, 248
Pac. 374 (1926).
This case falls within a class which make up a large portion of the res
ipsa loquitur decisions and is second only to the carrier cases in the application
of the doctrine. The doctrine of restpsa loquitur has found a frequent application in cases of injuries from falling objects and substances. Dixon v.
Pluns, 98 Cal. 384, 33 Pac. 268, 35 Am. St. Rep. 180, 20 L. R. A. 698 (1893)
Carl v. Young, 103 Me. 100, 68 AtI. 593, 125 Am. St. Rep. 290, 14 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 425 (1907) -00 R. C. L. 191. The basis of the application of this doctrine to this class of cases rests upon the duty which the owner of a building
abutting upon a public highway or street owes to the public to have the building safe so as not to harm those passing upon the sidewalk or highway.
Atchison v.Plunkett, 8 Kan. App. 308, 55 Pac. 677 (1899). Arising from this
duty has come the rule that as soon as an injury to a person, while a passenger
upon the street, occurs by reason of anything falling from a building, then the
burden shifts to the owner of the building to rebut the prima facie case of
negligence made out against him. Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567 15 Am.
Rep. 530 (1874) Ryder v. Kinsey, 62, Minn. 85, 34 L. R. A. 557, 54 Am. St.
Rep. 623, 64 N. W 94 (1895) SHEAiMx. . REDF. NEGLIGENCE (6th ed.), §§ 59-62;
Anderson v.McCarthy Dry Goods Co., 49 Wash. 398, 95 Pac. 325, 125 Am. St.
Rep. 870, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 931 (1908). In order to make out a prima facte
case of negligence against the owner of the building, the accident must have
been such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen, and no adequate
explanation of its occurrence is offered by the owner of the building. Waller
v. Ross, 100 Minn. 7, 110 N. W 252, 117 Am. St. Rep. 661, 10 Ann. Cas. 715,
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12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 721 (1907), Wolf v. American Trac. Sec., 164 N. Y. 30,
58 N. E. 31, 51 L. M. A. 241 (1900), Graaf v. Vulcan Iron Works, 59 Wash.
325, 109 Pac. 1016 (1910). The placing of the burden of proof upon the defendant may be supported upon the same principle that caused the growth of
the doctrine of res spsa loquitur in carrier cases, namely, the difficulty of proving negligence on the part of the carrier, or on the part of the owner of the
building. The doctrine is well founded and supported by cases in a great
number of jurisdictions. Wodnik v. Luna Park Amusement Co., 69 Wash. 638,
125 Pac. 941, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1070 (1912) Griffin v. Boston i Albany R.
Co., 148 Mass. 143, 19 N. E. 166, 12 Am. St. Rep. 526, 1 L. R. A. 698 (1889).
G. De G.
NEoLIGEcE-LAmT CrEAn CHACE.-T was an invitee m an automobile
driven by C, under such circumstances that the negligence of C could not
be imputed to T. C's car collided with that driven by D, injuring T. T sues
D, who introduced evidence tending to show that C's car was on the wrong
side of the road, and that such was a proximate cause of the accident. Upon
the introduction of this evidence T requested and the Court gave an instruction
embodying the doctrine of last clear chance upon the theory that after perceiving the position of C's car, D mght have avoided the collision by turning
off the pavement onto a level space adjoimng, used for parking and occasionally
for street purposes. Held. The instruction was properly given. Thompson v.
Collins, 139 Vash. Dec. 305, 247 Pac. 458 (1926).
Most of the earlier decisions, including those in Washington, explain the
doctrine of last clear chance upon the basis that in those cases where the doctrine has been applied, the defendant's negligence is the proximate cause of
the injury, while that of the plaintiff is only a remote cause. Nicol v. OregonWashington By. and Navigation Co., 71 Wash. 409, 128 Pac. 628 (1912), Drown
v. Northern Ohio Traction Co., 76 Oio 234, 81 N. E. 306, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.)
421 (1907) Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 109, 84 AUt. 301, 45 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 896 (1912).
This reasoning, however, is unsatisfactory, for if the question is solely one
of proximate cause, then logically the doctrine ought to apply as between joint
defendants charged by a plaintiff with separate acts of negligence. But the
rule is well settled that such defendants cannot avail themselves of the last
clear chance doctrine, as between themselves, and as against the plaintiff's right
to recover. See: Cordinerv. Los Angeles Traction Co., 5 Cal. App. 400, 91 Pac.
436 (1907), Shield v. F .Tohnson k Son, 132 La. 773, 61 So. 787, 47 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1080 (1913).
A more satisfactory basis for the doctrine thus becomes necessary so that
later cases take the position that the doctrine of last clear chance is an exception to, and a limitation upon, the rather harsh rule of contributory negligence.
This exception is based upon considerations of policy. See: Young v. Southern
Pacific, 189 Cal. 746, 210 Pac. 359 (1922) Dahner v. Northern Pacific, 48 Mont.
152, 136 Pac. 1059 (1913), Muskogee Electric Traction Co. v. Tice, 243 Pac.
(Okla.) 175 (1925).
Talng this view of the doctrine of last clear chance, its injection into a.
case, where the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence and where
such negligence could not be imputed to him, as in the principal case, would
seem unwarranted. In such a case the only negligence involved is that of the
defendant, and the liability, if any, should be predicated, it would seem, on the
ordinary rules of negligence. There is much dictum both in the Washington
decisions and elsewhere to the effect that the doctrine of last clear chance presupposes contributory negligence. Hartley v. Lasater, 96 Wash. 407, 165 Pac.
106 (1917), Hubenthal v. Spokane and Inland By. 97 Wash. 581, 166 Pac. 797
(1917), Burlie v. Stephens, 113 Wash. 182, 193 Pac. 681 (1920), Darling v.
Pacific Electric Co., 242 Pac. (Cal.) 703 (1925) Anderson v. Missoula St. By.
Co,. 54 Mont. 83, 167 Pac. 841 (1917) McGowan v. Layman, 132 S. E. (Va.)
316 (1926).
There are a number of cases where the point here raised was more directly
at issue than in the cases above cited, all holding that the application of the doc-
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trine of last clear chance to a case where contributory negligence is not involved is erroneous. Woodward v. McGraw, 71 Colo. 287 206 Pac. 386 (19,2)
Hartlagev. Louisville, 180 Ind. 666, 103 N. E. 737 (1913), State v. Washington
B. 8S A. Electric By., 131 AUl. (Md.) 822 (1926) Dahmer v. Northern Pacific,
supra.
B. B.

PAY ET-PRESU31PTION OF PAYMENT-PROOF OF PAYMENT BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EvinxicE.-Plaintiff sued on an alleged contract for work and labor

performed five years after the cause of action accrued but within the period
fixed by the Statute of Limitations. The pleadings raised the issue as to the
amount due, defendant claiming a payment of $182 as a settlement in full,
while plaintiff claimed the sum of $464.84 as still due. The lower court denied
defendant's offer of proof, made for the purpose of proving payment circumstantially, that plaintiff was in needy condition at the time debt was due and
never asked the defendant for payment. The evidence indirectly shows that the
defendant was able to pay. Held. Two judges dissenting, the offer was irrelevant under the issues and, the error, if any in refusing to submit the evidence
to the jury, harmless. Thompson v. Larson, 247 Pac. (Ore.) 139 (1926).
Payment is a fact which may be proven by circumstantial as well as direct
evidence. Garner v. Renner, 51 Ind. 372 (1875) McAllister v. Chambers, 71
Wash. 521, 129 Pac. 85 (1913). The evidence must, of course, be relevant, but
great latitude is allowed in the adrmssion of circumstantial evidence. Baugher
v. Boley, 63 Fla. 75, 87, 58 So. 980 (1912) Shannon v. Kinney, 1 A. K. Marsh
(Ky.) 3, 10 Am. Dec. 705 (1817). At common law mere lapse of time for
twenty years as to a matter not embraced by the statute of limitations raised
a rebuttable presumption of payment. The period was determined by analogy
Barnes v. Duren, 3
to the period fixed by the statute of limitations. Stovers
Strob. (S. C.) 448, 51 Am. Dec. 634 (1849) Holway v. Sanborn, 145 Wis. 151,
130 N. W 95 (1911) 21 R. C. L. 134; Graves v. Stone, 72 WVash. 382, 130 Pac.
369 (1913) rehearing 135 Pac. 810. But there appears to be no good reason why
a defendant may not avail himself of the presumption of payment if it is applicable, although the action is brought on an obligation covered by the statute
of limitations. Courtney v. Standenmeyer 56 Kan. 392, 43 Pac. 758, 54 A. S. R.
59- (1896). This rebuttable presumption of payment, to be aistingushed from
the conclusive presumption raised by the statute of limitations, never arises
from lapse of time alone, short of the period fixed by law. Adair v. Adair 5
Mich. 204, 71 Am. Dec. 779 (1858) and see Dietmann v. People ex rel BlackGraves v. Stone, supra. Yet in connection
man, 232 Pac. (Colo.) 676 (1925)
with other circumstances, lapse of time short of the period fixed by law, may
establish the fact of payment. Graves v. Stone, supra; Van Ness v. Ransom,
144 N. Y. S. 4-0, 83 Misc. Rep. 128, affirmed, 150 N. Y. S. 251, 161 App. Div.
483 (1914), affirmed, Parsons v. McFarlane, 115 N. E. 1046 (1917). The fact
that a creditor fluring the period when he might have enforced his demand by
suit, if he had one, needed the money, is a relevant circumstance tending to
strengthen the presumption that the demand has been paid or otherwise satisfied. Bean v. Tonnelle, 94 N. Y. 381, 46 Am. Rep. 153 (1884) Graves v. Stone,
supra; and see 8 Ann. Cas. 779. The circumstances of lapse of time, the character of the creditor for strictness in the collection of debts due lum, the creditor's need, and the debtor's ability to pay are all circumstances to be considered in raising the rebuttable presumption of payment. Stone v. Tupper 58 Vt.
409, 5 AUl. 387 (1886) 21 R. C. L. 135. The existence of the presumption
operates to shift the burden of going forward wtih the evidence of payment.
Stover 0 Barnes v. Duren, supra; Graves v. Stone, supra, and see 22 C. J. 79.
In the principal case, the issue of payment by settlement being raised, it
would seem that evidence of the creditor's needy circumstances coupled with his
failure to ask for the claim for five years when the debtor appears to have been
able to pay, should have been admitted as tending to raise the presumption that
a payment by settlement had in fact been made; and exclusion of such material
evidence from the jury would appear to be prejudicial error. See Hamilton v.
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defendant left the employment of the plaintiff Ice Co., and some months later
entering the service of a competing company, solicited and served ice customers
of the plaintiff, known to the defendant from his former service as driver for
the plaintiff. Held. The defendant should not be enjoined from so doing. Ice
Delivery Co. of Spokane v. Davis, 137 Wash. 649, 43 Pac. 849 (1926). The case
was followed in City Ice Co. v. Kinne, 40 Wash. Dec. 286, 249 Pac. 782 (1926).
The principles which govern such cases are similar to those governing the
protection of other manufacturing and marketing secrets. The basis of the
relief is sometimes said to be property, sometimes implied contract, and sometimes unfair competition. As to the first it has been well said that "The word
property as applied to trade secrets and trade marks is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes
some rudimentary reqinrements of good faith." Holmes, J., in Du Pont v. Masland, 244 U. S. 100 (1917).
While as to the second---"to imply a contract where none exists is not satisfactory as a ground of relief, being merely another way of saying that no
contract is necessary." 19 CoL. L. REvIEw 325. Yet the contract implied in fact
may often be a satisfactory basis of relief, because justice to the employer will
usually prevent his restraint except where he knew, or ought reasonably to have
known, at the time he occupied the fiduciary relationship, that the thing now
called a secret was in fact a secret See E. P Fish, "The Etlncs of Trade
Secrets" 29 Pnoc. Air. Soc. MEcH. Eixo. 13, 31 (1907). Where that appears,
an actual contract could usually, but not always, be implied in fact, and unless
it was so broad as to be in restraint of trade, equity would enforce it by injunction. Fraliclh v. Despar, 165 Pa. 24, 30 AUt. 521 (1904), Harrison v. Glucose
Refining Co., 116 Fed. 304, 312 (C. C. A. 7th Circ. 190), Norfolk v. Peabody,
98 Mass. 452 (1865).
The third theory, that of unfair competition, which is the one relied on in
the principal case, would seem to be the one which best explains the cases.
19 COL. L. REviEw 236. In the absence of contract, it is only as a protection
to an existing business that the court will restrain the commumcation or use
of such secrets. Bristol v. Equitable Life Company, 132 N. Y. 264, 30 N. E.
506 (189).
Considering the matter on the very broadest principles, it would seem to
be a positive act resulting in irreparable damage to the plaintiff, which being
rooted in breach of contract and abuse of a fiduciary capacity, is unjustifiable.
As such it would be a tort, and such a tort as equity would prevent. See 18
HAn. L. RPv. 411. The problem of the court is to determine what actually constitutes a breach of confidence, and when the relationship between employer and
employee is such a one that good faith demands that knowledge gained therein
be held in secret. The Court has quite properly determined that the line is
somewhere between the facts of the well known case of John Davis t Co. v.
Miller, 104 Wash. 444, 177 Pac. 323 (1918), and those of the principal case.
Although they will not always enjoin the use of knowledge of a former
employer's customers, where that knowledge is carried away in the head, yet the
courts will not tolerate the making or carrying away of lists of customers.
Doods v. Grand Union Tea Co., 164 Mich. 50, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 260, 128 N. W
1090 (1910), Lamb v. Evans (1893) 1 Ch. -18; and the annotations in 23 A. L. R.
4-5 and 34 A. L. R. 395. It is easier to recogmze property rights in a written
list than in confidential information not reduced to writing. Thus in Robb V.
Green [1895] 2 Q. B. 315 (C. A.), it is said that the defendant who copied a
list and used it was using stolen material. But as pointed out in Davis ' Co.
v. Miller, supra, it is the information which is valuable, not the list, and no
valid distinction on that theory can be made between copying the knowledge
from lists and carrying it away in memory. It is submitted that the true reason
for the distinction is this: The law, wherever it deems it itself able, will pre-
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vent or redress the wilful causing of damage to another if it is possible to do
so without restricting the defendant's freedom of action in a particular deemed
valuable by the law. But if the preventing or redressing of the damage would
tend to restrict the freedom of action of other persons, i. e., employees, m a
manner deemed impolitic, it is a case of damnum absque in3urza.
"For him [the employee] to be compelled to give up all his friends and
business acquaintances, made during his previous employment, would tend to
destroy the freedom of employees and reduce them to a condition of industrial
servitude," p. 16 of principal case. Hence the damage must be endured without
remedy But it is never necessary to the employee's proper freedom of action
that he be allowed to copy his employer's lists, and there is no valid objection
to preventing that. See Kay L. J., in Lamb v. Evans, supra.
While the taking or copying of lists should be a sufficient basis for relief,
it should not be necessary to the interposition of the law, anymore than it is in
the case of other trade secrets. The ultimate extent of the remedy will depend
on what degree of good faith may be reqmred without too seriously restricting
a freedom of action valuale to society. Whether or not the information could
be discovered fairly, is not, it would seem, the test (as it was intimated to be
by one of the authorities cited in the principal case). "Because this discovery
may be possible by fair means, does not justify a discovery by unfair
" Tarbor v. Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30, 23 N. E. 12 (1889).
means
0. B. K.

BOOK REVIEWS
BusixEss LAW-ITvaoDUCTORY CoisRE. By Leslie J. Ayer. Seattle:
Wood & Reber, Inc., 1926, pp. 474.
The solution of the problem of teaching business law, that is, of teaching
a limited legal subj ect-matter in a limited time to students who are intending
to be, or are, business men and not lawyers, has been approached through many
avenues. This book represents the solution of a professional law teacher who
has had more than fifteen years of experience as a teacher in recognized law
schools, and who has for more than a decade rendered a part-time service to the
school of business administration at the University of Washington, in teaching
business law. He entertains the opinion that the same reasons which have
caused modern law schools to abandon the text method and to adopt the
laboratory method of case teaching exists for the introduction of the case
method into so-called business law courses; that is to say, that a business man,
just as the regular law student, will profit most by a study and analysis of
legal principles in concrete situations passed upon by courts of justice.
The writer, after an introduction designed to prepare the student for
intelligent study has selected interesting as well as leading cases, and in the
development of a subject uses the standard legal classifications. The book deals
primarily with contracts. The author also devotes some treatment to remedies,
dividing this subject into sections covering damages, specific relief, and the
miscellaneous remedies involved in receiverships, assignments for the benefit
of creditors, bankruptcy proceedings, and claims against decedents' estates.
The case book uses headnotes only as introductory to large subdivisions of
the subject-matter treated, and has thus reserved the analysis of specific cases
for the student without stating the solution for lum. Tis method is commendable in that it makes the solution of the problem not a matter of memorizinr but of subjective analysis. The judgment with which the cases in this
book are selected and the care with which they are edited can perhaps be best
expressed in the language of the reviewer for one of the large New York publising companies other than that hereafter named, as follows:
"Like all case books, the contents consist almost entirely of complete or edited reports of cases decided by the various courts of appeal
CASES ON

